This paper conducts an event study analysis to empirically assess the industry impact of cartels. Using a sample of recent European cartel cases, we estimate the effect of the surprise inspection and final decision on the stock market value of cartel and non-cartel firms. The impact of both events is consistently negative for cartel members. For non-cartel members, significant negative and positive effects are found on days around the events. Overall, however, we find weak evidence for a negative impact of the surprise inspection on noncartel suppliers. In accordance with theory, this suggests that cartels may create additional damages through positively affecting the performance of their competitors. ____________________________________________ a We thank Lars Quaedvlieg for his excellent research assistance. All opinions and errors are ours alone. b Department of Organization & Strategy, Maastricht University, The Netherlands, corresponding author at: P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands. E-mail address: i.bos@maastrichtuniversity.nl. c Department of Organization & Strategy, Maastricht University, The Netherlands. d Department of Organization & Strategy, Maastricht University, The Netherlands.

中文翻译：

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卡特尔的行业影响：来自股票市场的证据1

本文进行了一项事件研究分析，以实证评估卡特尔的行业影响。我们使用最近的欧洲卡特尔案件样本，估计了突击检查和最终决定对卡特尔和非卡特尔公司的股票市场价值的影响。这两个事件对卡特尔成员的影响始终是负面的。对于非卡特尔会员，在活动发生的几天内会发现明显的负面和正面影响。但是，总的来说，我们发现证据不足，表明突击检查对非卡特彼勒供应商有负面影响。根据理论，这表明卡特尔可能通过积极影响其竞争对手的表现而造成额外的损害。______________________________________________ a感谢拉斯·奎德弗利格的出色研究支持。所有观点和错误都是我们自己的。b荷兰马斯特里赫特大学组织与战略系，通讯作者：荷兰马斯特里赫特，邮政信箱616，6200 MD。电子邮件地址：i.bos@maastrichtuniversity.nl。c荷兰马斯特里赫特大学组织与战略系。d荷兰马斯特里赫特大学组织与战略系。