Abstract

This research investigated the metacognitive underpinnings of moral judgment. Participants in two studies were asked to provide quick intuitive responses to moral dilemmas and to indicate their feeling of rightness about those responses. Afterwards, participants were given extra time to rethink their responses, and change them if they so wished. The feeling of rightness associated with the initial judgments was predictive of whether participants chose to change their responses and how long they spent rethinking them. Thus, one’s metacognitive experience upon first coming up with a moral judgment influences whether one sticks to that initial gut feeling or decides to put more thought into it and revise it. Moreover, while the type of moral judgment (i.e., deontological vs. utilitarian) was not consistently predictive of metacognitive experience, the extremity of that judgment was: Extreme judgments (either deontological or utilitarian) were quicker and felt more right than moderate judgments.

摘要

这项研究调查了道德判断的元认知基础。要求两项研究的参与者提供对道德困境的快速直观反应，并表明他们对这些反应的正确感觉。之后，给参与者更多的时间来重新考虑他们的反应，并在需要时改变他们。与最初的判断相关的正确感可以预测参与者是否选择改变他们的反应以及他们花了多长时间重新思考它们。因此，一个人在第一次提出道德判断时的元认知经验会影响他是坚持最初的直觉还是决定多加思考并对其进行修改。此外，尽管道德判断的类型（即，道义论与功利主义）不能始终如一地预测元认知经验，