This note examines the controversial case of Durie v Gardiner, a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, which radically altered the nation's public libel jurisprudence. It argues that Durie is incorrect as a matter of public libel law for three reasons. First, both Durie judgments failed to engage in freedom of expression theorising. Second, this undertheorising has caused significant confusion in Durie, including misinterpretation of material facts, breakdown of the ‘theory‐doctrine’ interface, and a precipitous and unwarranted dismissal of the Court of Appeal's settled public libel principles. Third, owing to these difficulties, the Durie courts were in no position to import a new ‘public interest’ defence from foreign jurisdictions. Above all, by hastening towards wholesale law reform and ignoring its earlier comparative law deliberations, Durie arguably scuppers public libel law's best hope for advancement.

中文翻译：

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杜里诉加迪纳案：公共诽谤法和凝视非决定

本说明考察了新西兰上诉法院最近裁定的颇具争议的案件“ Durie诉Gardiner”案，该案从根本上改变了该国的公共诽谤法理学。它认为，杜里在公共诽谤法方面是不正确的，原因有三点。首先，杜里的两项判决均未涉及表达自由理论。其次，这种不合理的理论在杜丽（Durie）中引起了极大的困惑，包括对实质性事实的误解，“理论-理论”界面的破裂以及对上诉法院已解决的公开诽谤原则的猛烈而无理的驳回。第三，由于这些困难，杜蕾法院无权从外国司法管辖区引入新的“公共利益”辩护。最重要的是，杜莉可以通过加快批发法改革，而忽略其较早的比较法审议，可以说是sc毁了公共诽谤法发展的最大希望。