We study the efficiency of the standard‐setting process when standards result from competition between groups of firms sponsoring different technologies. We show that ex ante agreements may decrease welfare in the case of standards wars: Even though industry profits are larger with ex ante agreements, welfare is not necessarily larger, because the interests of firms and society may not be aligned. This result contrasts with the findings of previous works studying de jure monopoly standards. Including adopters in the standard‐setting process may restore the efficiency of ex ante agreements.

中文翻译：

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标准战争中的技术选择与联盟形成

当标准来自赞助不同技术的公司集团之间的竞争而产生时，我们研究标准制定过程的效率。我们发现，事前协议可以在标准之战的情况下，减少福利：尽管行业利润具有较大的事前协议，福利不一定大，因为企业和社会的利益可能无法对齐。该结果与先前研究法律上的垄断标准的研究结果相反。在标准制定过程中包括采用者，可以恢复事前协议的效率。