On‐demand service firms secure market power by cultivating and operationalising calculative asymmetries between the platform and labour. In this article, I analyse dynamic (or ‘surge’) pricing as an exemplary calculative technique. I show how the asymmetrical application of price‐setting allows firms to leverage control at the aggregate level while maintaining the façade of autonomy at the individual level, thereby legitimising workers’ classification as independent contractors but solving the coordination problems that the classification introduces. The article complements and extends previous critical research into the platform or ‘on‐demand’ service economy by analysing how management scientists model and simulate on‐demand marketplaces. I consider management science to be a calculative technique for optimising operational efficiency. A critical review of management science provides novel insights into platforms’ efforts to monopolise calculative agency at the expense of other market participants. The article concludes by considering implications for broader critiques of platform labour management.

中文翻译：

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动态漏洞利用：按需经济中的计算不对称

按需服务公司通过在平台和劳动力之间培养和操作计算不对称性来确保市场势力。在本文中，我将动态（或“激增”）定价分析为一种示例性的计算技术。我展示了价格设定的非对称应用如何使企业在总体层面上利用控制权，同时又保持个人层面上的自主权，从而使工人分类为独立承包商合法化，但解决了分类带来的协调问题。本文通过分析管理科学家如何对按需市场进行建模和仿真，将先前的关键研究补充并扩展到平台或“按需”服务经济中。我认为管理科学是优化运营效率的一种计算技术。对管理科学的批判性评论提供了对平台垄断计算代理机构的努力的新颖见解，而却以牺牲其他市场参与者为代价。本文的结论是考虑对平台劳工管理的广泛批评的含义。