Research on coalition negotiations after general elections in parliamentary systems usually focuses on the parties’ utility maximization as corporate actors. However, the most recent process of government formation after the German general election in 2017 followed a different type of logic and led to an outcome unlike that of other coalition negotiations. Regarding policy seeking, office seeking, and vote seeking, the outcomes of both the exploratory talks between Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU)/Christlich‐Soziale Union (CSU), Freie Demokratische Partei, and the Greens and the negotiations between CDU/CSU and Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands are at least partly irrational from a cost–benefit analysis. This article examines the formation of Germany’s government in 2017–2018 and reveals the paradoxical outcomes of each phase of the negotiations. Empirical data to underpin the argument stem from interviews with negotiators and statements of direct participants in the formation of the coalition. Instead of the parties’ utility maximization, negotiations were largely dominated by intraparty conflicts, in which individual interests and personal trust rather than partisan unitary programs were most relevant to the negotiation process and outcome. Our work answers the question of why the grand coalition was unexpectedly renewed in the end—contrary to what might be predicted based on established theories of coalition building. The observations and conclusions set forth are of general interest not only for future coalition negotiations in Germany but also for other European parliamentary democracies facing increasing party fragmentation. Most importantly, the analysis yields insights into negotiations undertaken in the absence of rationalist behavior.

中文翻译：

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联盟谈判的新见解—以德国政府组建为例

议会制大选后的联盟谈判研究通常集中在当事方作为公司行为者的最大效用上。然而，2017年德国大选后的最新政府组建程序遵循了不同的逻辑，导致了与其他联盟谈判不同的结果。关于政策寻求，职位寻求和投票，克里斯蒂希·德意志民主联盟（CDU）/克里斯蒂里希·索济阿莱联盟（CSU），弗雷德·民主联盟，绿党之间的探索性对话的结果以及CDU / CSU和Sozialdemokratische之间的谈判从成本效益分析来看，德国党至少部分不合理。本文考察了2017-2018年德国政府的组成，并揭示了谈判各阶段的矛盾结果。支持该论点的经验数据来自与谈判者的访谈和联盟成立中直接参与者的陈述。谈判主要是由党内冲突主导，而不是当事方的效用最大化，在这种冲突中，个人利益和个人信任而不是党派统一计划与谈判过程和结果最为相关。我们的工作回答了为什么大联盟最终会意外更新的问题，这与基于既定的联盟建设理论所做出的预测相反。提出的意见和结论不仅对于德国未来的联盟谈判具有普遍意义，而且对于面临越来越多的政党分裂的其他欧洲议会民主国家也具有普遍意义。最重要的是，分析得出了在没有理性主义行为的情况下进行的谈判的见识。