In this article, we analyze and reject two versions of the content-argument against animal beliefs, namely, the ontological argument from Davidson and the epistemological argument from Stich. One of the main defects of the strongest version of the argument is that it over-intellectualizes belief ascriptions in humans and thus sets the comparative bar for belief ascriptions in animals too high. In the second part of the article, we develop a gradualist notion of belief which captures basic beliefs as well as Davidsonian linguistic beliefs, and we specify the conditions under which belief ascriptions to nonlinguistic animals are justified.

中文翻译：

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如何将信念归因于动物

在本文中，我们分析并拒绝了反对动物信仰的两个版本的内容论证，即戴维森的本体论论证和斯蒂奇的认识论论证。该论点的最强版本的主要缺陷之一是它过度理智化了人类的信仰归属，因此将动物信仰归属的比较标准设置得太高。在文章的第二部分，我们发展了一种渐进主义的信念概念，它涵盖了基本信念以及戴维森的语言信念，并且我们指定了将信念归因于非语言动物的条件。