A Cournot collaboration game is complemented with the hypothesis that the cost of R&D collaboration depends on firm’s directed knowledge distance with respect to potential R&D partners. The further hypothesis that directed distance may be non‐uniform and pair‐wise asymmetric reconciles theoretical predictions with qualitative evidence about concentration and multiplicity of components in industrial R&D networks. The welfare properties of sparse stable networks are also affected.

中文翻译：

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古诺寡头垄断中的知识距离和研发合作

古诺协作游戏补充了以下假设：研发协作的成本取决于公司相对于潜在研发合作伙伴的定向知识距离。定向距离可能不均匀且成对不对称的进一步假设使理论预测与有关工业研发网络中组分的浓度和多样性的定性证据相一致。稀疏稳定网络的福利属性也会受到影响。