Government transparency is a key component of democratic accountability. The U.S. Congress and the president have created multiple legislative avenues to facilitate executive branch transparency with the public. However, when the executive branch withholds requested information from the public, the federal judiciary has the power to determine whether agencies must release documents and information to requestors. When enforcing standards of executive branch transparency, judges must balance concerns of executive autonomy and judicial intrusion into administrative decisionmaking. While much judicial scholarship focuses on the decisionmaking on high courts, in the U.S. context, federal district courts play a key role in adjudicating transparency disputes. In this article, I examine case outcomes in disputes involving agency claims of deliberative process privilege over internal agency documents litigated between 1994 and 2004. I find that U.S. federal district courts largely defer to administrative agencies in transparency disputes. However, factors such as agency structure and the congruence between judicial and administrative agency policy preferences influence whether federal judges require executive branch officials to release requested information.

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裁定行政特权：美国地方法院的联邦行政机关和协商程序特权主张

政府透明度是民主问责制的关键组成部分。美国国会和总统创造了多种立法途径，以促进行政部门对公众的透明度。但是，当行政部门隐瞒公众要求的信息时，联邦司法机关有权决定代理机构是否必须向请求者发布文件和信息。在执行行政部门透明度的标准时，法官必须权衡行政自主权和司法干预行政决策的关注。尽管许多司法学者都将重点放在高等法院的决策上，但在美国，联邦地方法院在裁决透明度纠纷中起着关键作用。在这篇文章中，我审查了涉及代理机构对1994年至2004年之间诉讼的内部代理机构文件的议事程序特权的争端中的案件结果。我发现，美国联邦地方法院在透明度纠纷中主要服从于行政机构。但是，诸如机构结构以及司法和行政机构政策偏好之间的一致性等因素影响着联邦法官是否要求行政部门官员发布所要求的信息。