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There is no ‘I’ in team: Career concerns, risk‐taking incentives, and team outcomes
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ( IF 2.245 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-04 , DOI: 10.1111/jems.12396
Phong T. H. Ngo 1 , Steven Roberts 1
Affiliation  

The National Basketball Association contracting rules provide plausibly exogenous variation in career concerns near contract end. We use this setting to study how individual career concerns affect risk‐taking behavior and can sabotage team performance. Using the frequency and duration of player injuries from 1991 to 2013 we measure individual risk‐taking behavior. We find that the average player's likelihood of missing a game due to injury falls by 0.06 percentage points (or over 100% relative to the mean injury rate) in the final 3 months of his contract, and when missing games due to injury is unavoidable, his recovery time drops by 22 days. However, “elite” players with virtually no career concerns actually miss more games due to injury. Finally, we find that elite players missing too many games and “average” players playing before healthy, combine to hurt team performance. For each additional player in the last 3 months on contract, the win probability for that team falls by over 2.6%.

中文翻译:

团队中没有“我”:职业问题,冒险动机和团队成果

国家篮球协会的签约规则在合同临近结束时提供了职业方面的外生变化。我们使用此设置来研究个人职业问题如何影响冒险行为并破坏团队绩效。利用1991年至2013年球员受伤的频率和持续时间,我们可以衡量个人的冒险行为。我们发现,在合同的最后3个月内,平均玩家因受伤而缺席比赛的可能性下降了0.06个百分点(或相对于平均伤害率超过100%),当不可避免地因受伤而缺席比赛时,他的恢复时间缩短了22天。但是,实际上没有职业顾虑的“精英”球员由于受伤实际上错过了更多比赛。最后,我们发现精英玩家错过了太多比赛,而“平均”玩家在健康之前就玩了,结合在一起会损害团队绩效。在最近3个月的合同中,每增加一名球员,该球队的获胜概率就会下降2.6%以上。
更新日期:2020-08-04
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