The paper studies incentives of low‐quality sellers to disclose negative information about their products. We develop a model in which one's quality can be communicated via cheap‐talk messages only. This setting limits the ability of high‐quality sellers to separate, as any communication strategy they pursue can be costlessly imitated by low‐quality sellers. We study two factors that can incentivize low‐quality sellers to communicate their quality: buyers' loss aversion and competition. Quality disclosure reduces buyers' risk, thereby increasing their willingness to pay for the product. It also introduces product differentiation, softening the competition.

中文翻译：

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激励劣质卖家披露负面信息

本文研究了低质量卖家披露其产品负面信息的动机。我们建立了一个模型，在该模型中，只能通过廉价对话消息传达自己的质量。此设置限制了高质量卖方的分离能力，因为他们追求的任何交流策略都可以被劣质卖方无偿地模仿。我们研究了可以激励劣质卖方传达其质量的两个因素：买方的损失厌恶和竞争。质量公开降低了买家的风险，从而提高了他们购买产品的意愿。它还引入了产品差异化，从而软化了竞争。