ABSTRACT

Using branch-level licensing data for 13 states, we examine cross-border effects of state-level payday-lending policies on new and operating branches within border counties from January 2005 to December 2010. We hypothesize branch counts are higher in border counties adjacent to states that restrict payday lending through prohibitive fee limits due to decreased competition and higher excess profits from cross-border markets. Predicted results for effects of enabling or non-existent payday lending policy are ambiguous; cross-border markets may or may not have increased competition given established market practices. Results show border counties adjacent to prohibitive states have 14 percent more operating branches and 83 percent more new branches than interior counties, suggesting clustering and expansion in regions with access to cross-border consumers that lack in-state access to payday loans. Border counties adjacent to states with enabling regulations have 30 percent more operating branches relative to interior counties, suggesting clustering in cross-border markets.

摘要

使用13个州的分支机构级许可数据，我们研究了州级发薪日贷款政策对2005年1月至2010年12月边境县内新分支机构和运营分支机构的跨境影响。我们假设与之相邻的边境县的分支机构数量更高州规定，由于竞争减少和跨境市场的高额超额利润，通过禁止性费用限制来限制发薪日贷款。启用或不存在的发薪日贷款政策的预期结果尚不明确；根据既定的市场惯例，跨境市场竞争可能加剧也可能没有加剧。结果显示，与禁令州相邻的边境县比内县多出14％的营业分支机构和83％的新分支机构，建议在缺乏本州获得发薪日贷款的跨境消费者的地区聚集和扩展。与实施法规的州相邻的边境县的营业分支机构比内陆县多30％，这表明在跨境市场中存在集群。