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Less competitive bank markets: Conventional and unconventional monetary policies through bank‐lending channels
International Finance ( IF 1.204 ) Pub Date : 2019-12-25 , DOI: 10.1111/infi.12364
Yasuhiro Yamamoto 1
Affiliation  

Bank competition in Japan is weakening. This study theoretically analyzes the supply side of the bank loan market to examine how this weak banking competition influences the effectiveness of monetary policies. In a Cournot game, there are efficient banks, and inefficient banks that must pay a risk premium in the call market. Less competitive banks either go out of business or merge with efficient banks. The call rate and risk premium are central banks’ policy instruments. This paper's main finding is that, with a few exceptions, the weak competition reduces the effectiveness of monetary policies because concentration decreases the volume of bank loans. However, concentration makes monetary policy via a reduced risk premium more effective when this policy targets inefficient banks that do not exit or merge. In response to lending declines by efficient banks when they exit or merge, inefficient banks increase their lending activity.

中文翻译:

竞争激烈的银行市场:通过银行贷款渠道的常规和非常规货币政策

日本的银行竞争正在减弱。这项研究从理论上分析了银行贷款市场的供给方,以研究这种疲软的银行竞争如何影响货币政策的有效性。在古诺(Gournot)游戏中,有效率较高的银行和效率较低的银行,它们必须在通话市场中支付风险溢价。竞争力较弱的银行要么倒闭,要么与有效率的银行合并。赎回利率和风险溢价是中央银行的政策工具。本文的主要发现是,除少数例外,竞争疲弱会降低货币政策的有效性,因为集中会减少银行贷款的数量。但是,当集中度降低了不退出或合并的低效银行时,集中化​​将通过降低风险溢价使货币政策更加有效。
更新日期:2019-12-25
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