National oil companies (NOCs) have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign oil and gas assets. Why have some governments increased their NOC outward investments, while others have not? I argue that domestic structures can influence a government's calculus that potential benefits, such as added revenues and fuel supply, outweigh potential costs, such as information asymmetries and inefficiencies associated with NOCs. Nationally, partisan competition limits democratic tolerance for failures by NOCs. Bureaucratically, overlapping authority in energy policy undermines coherent NOC governance. Based on investments by NOCs hailing from 79 countries, 2000–2013, I find robust evidence for the national hypothesis.

中文翻译：

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培养全球冠军：国家石油公司为何向海外扩张

国家石油公司（NOC）已在外国石油和天然气资产中投资了数千亿美元。为什么有些政府增加了NOC对外投资，而另一些却没有呢？我认为，国内结构可能会影响政府的计算，即潜在的收益（例如增加的收入和燃料供应）会超过潜在的成本（例如与NOC相关的信息不对称和效率低下）。在全国范围内，党派竞争限制了NOC对失败的民主容忍。官僚主义地，能源政策中重叠的权力破坏了NOC的连贯治理。根据2000年至2013年来自79个国家/地区的NOC的投资，我发现了关于国家假设的有力证据。