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The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress
Economics & Politics ( IF 1.262 ) Pub Date : 2019-11-11 , DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12149
Paola Conconi 1 , Giovanni Facchini 2 , Max F. Steinhardt 3 , Maurizio Zanardi 4
Affiliation  

We compare the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970s. Standard trade theory suggests that trade reforms that lower barriers to goods from less skilled‐labor abundant countries and migration reforms that lower barriers to low‐skilled migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low‐skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high‐skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled‐labor abundant districts are more likely to support trade and migration reforms that benefit high‐skilled workers. Still, important differences exist: Democrats are less supportive of trade reforms than Republicans, while the opposite is true for migration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape votes on migration, but not on trade.

中文翻译:

贸易与移民的政治经济学:美国国会的证据

我们比较了自1970年代以来美国国会议员对贸易和移民改革的投票推动力。标准贸易理论认为,贸易改革应降低技术水平较低的富裕国家对商品的壁垒,而移民改革应降低对低技能移民的壁垒,这应产生类似的分配效应,既伤害低技能的美国工人,又使高技能的工人受益。根据这一预测,我们发现代表更多熟练劳动力丰富地区的众议院议员更有可能支持有利于高技能工人的贸易和移民改革。尽管如此,仍然存在重要的分歧:民主党人对贸易改革的支持不及共和党人,而移民改革则相反。福利国家的考虑因素和网络效应决定着移民的票数,而不是贸易的票数。
更新日期:2019-11-11
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