This paper studies an overlooked phenomenon in the provision of public goods, namely local production of a national public good, such as the manufacture of fighter planes (which contribute to national defence) in many different jurisdictions across a country. Because local production of the national good raises local incomes, each jurisdiction seeks to raise its share of the good's production. A subset of jurisdictions then forms a minimum winning coalition, which offers equal production shares to its members and smaller (possibly zero) shares to non‐members, while choosing the provision level of the national good. The outcome is inefficient, with production inefficiently concentrated and the public good also overprovided (because income benefits reduce the good's perceived marginal cost). Empirical results confirm the prediction that the location of production is important in determining Congressional support for federal programme spending.

中文翻译：

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区域主义与萨缪尔森会面：国家公共产品的本地生产

本文研究了在公共产品的提供中被忽视的现象，即在一个国家的许多不同辖区中生产国民公共物品的本地生产，例如制造战斗机（这有助于国防）。由于本国产品的本地生产会增加当地收入，因此每个司法管辖区都在寻求提高其在该产品生产中的份额。然后，一部分辖区组成了一个最小的获胜联盟，该联盟向其成员提供相等的生产份额，向非成员提供较小的份额（可能为零），同时选择国民产品的供给水平。结果是效率低下的，生产效率低下的集中，公共物品的供给也过多（因为收入收益减少了商品的边际成本）。