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Reward-Based Crowdfunding: The Role of Information Disclosure
Decision Sciences ( IF 4.147 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-18 , DOI: 10.1111/deci.12486
Jue Liu 1 , Xiaofeng Liu 2 , Houcai Shen 1
Affiliation  

This article studies the role and value of information disclosure in a reward-based crowdfunding campaign for a new product development (NPD) project under quality uncertainty. The creator sets a funding target that is subject to a minimum capital requirement and prices for a leading backer and a following backer arriving in two sequential periods. The backers form a prior belief about the quality of the product and update their valuation according to their private signals before they decide whether to bid for the products. The leading backer's bid, if disclosed, may be used by the subsequent backer to infer the former's private signal. We identify two interacting effects that drive the bidding decisions and the profitability of the campaign: an observational learning effect driven by information disclosure and a targeting effect. When the target is relatively high, information disclosure can always benefit the creator. When the target is relatively low, information disclosure may hurt the creator. The optimal target level is always equal to the minimum capital requirement. We further extend the analysis to a setting with a forward-looking leading backer who may strategically wait and identify the conditions under which information disclosure can also increase the profitability of the campaign. Interestingly, to counteract the strategic delay, the optimal target can be set higher than the minimum capital requirement in the presence of information disclosure.

中文翻译:

基于奖励的众筹:信息披露的作用

本文研究了信息披露在质量不确定下的新产品开发 (NPD) 项目基于奖励的众筹活动中的作用和价值。创建者设定了一个资金目标,该目标受最低资本要求和价格的影响,主要支持者和后续支持者在两个连续期间到达。支持者形成对产品质量的先验信念,并根据他们的私人信号更新他们的估值,然后再决定是否竞标产品。主要支持者的出价,如果被披露,可能会被后续支持者用来推断前者的私人信号。我们确定了推动投标决策和活动盈利能力的两种相互作用的影响:由信息披露驱动的观察学习效应和目标效应。在目标较高的情况下,信息披露总能让创作者受益。当目标相对较低时,信息泄露可能会伤害创作者。最佳目标水平始终等于最低资本要求。我们进一步将分析扩展到具有前瞻性的领先支持者的环境,他们可能会战略性地等待并确定信息披露也可以增加活动盈利能力的条件。有趣的是,为了抵消战略延迟,在存在信息披露的情况下,可以将最优目标设定为高于最低资本要求。最佳目标水平始终等于最低资本要求。我们进一步将分析扩展到具有前瞻性的领先支持者的环境,他们可能会战略性地等待并确定信息披露也可以增加活动盈利能力的条件。有趣的是,为了抵消战略延迟,在存在信息披露的情况下,可以将最优目标设定为高于最低资本要求。最佳目标水平始终等于最低资本要求。我们进一步将分析扩展到具有前瞻性的领先支持者的环境,他们可能会战略性地等待并确定信息披露也可以增加活动盈利能力的条件。有趣的是,为了抵消战略延迟,在存在信息披露的情况下,可以将最优目标设定为高于最低资本要求。
更新日期:2020-09-18
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