This study examines reactions of financial analysts to the disclosure of corporate fraud. We posit that analysts downgrade earnings forecasts of fraudulent firms after fraud disclosure to signal their quality and integrity. We explore how internal and external contingencies shape analysts' reputational concerns, influence their motivation to signal via earnings downgrades, and consequently affect their responses to corporate fraud.

中文翻译：

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通过收益降级发出信号：声誉问题如何影响分析师对公司欺诈的反应？

本研究考察了财务分析师对公司舞弊披露的反应。我们假设分析师在欺诈披露后下调了欺诈公司的盈利预测，以表明其质量和诚信。我们探索内部和外部突发事件如何影响分析师的声誉担忧，如何影响他们通过收益降级发出信号的动机，并因此影响他们对公司欺诈的反应。