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DO SUPERVISORY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AFFECT board composition?
Corporate Governance: An International Review ( IF 5.660 ) Pub Date : 2020-10-18 , DOI: 10.1111/corg.12336
Matteo Cotugno 1 , Antonio D'Amato 2 , Angela Gallo 3 , Valeria Stefanelli 4
Affiliation  

Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: Do enforcement actions impact banks’ board composition? Based on a unique sample of sanctions imposed on Italian banks by the country's banking supervisory authority from 2009 to 2015, we investigate whether supervisory enforcement actions affect changes at the board level. Moreover, we examine whether changes at the board level after a sanction are effective in reducing the probability of further sanctions in the future. Research Findings/Insights: The findings reveal that sanctioned banks change their board composition following a supervisory sanction. We further test whether these changes improve bank governance and find that under certain conditions, they may reduce the probability that the board is sanctioned again. Robustness tests confirm the results. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study provides empirical evidence that supports the role of supervisory enforcement actions in inducing banks to adopt changes at the board level. Given that the relationship between supervisory sanctions and changes in board characteristics is still neglected, we contend that our results may increase the understanding of the effectiveness of enforcement actions in improving board characteristics. Practitioner/Policy Implications: We believe that our results have policy implications by making a clear and concrete contribution to the ongoing debate on the revision of the principles for enhancing corporate governance and banking supervision.

中文翻译:

监督执法行动会影响董事会的组成吗?

手稿类型:实证研究 问题/问题:执法行动是否会影响银行的董事会构成?根据意大利银行业监管机构 2009 年至 2015 年对意大利银行实施的独特制裁样本,我们调查了监管执法行动是否会影响董事会层面的变化。此外,我们研究了制裁后董事会层面的变化是否能有效降低未来进一步制裁的可能性。研究结果/见解:研究结果表明,受监管银行会在监管制裁后改变其董事会构成。我们进一步测试这些变化是否会改善银行治理,并发现在某些条件下,它们可能会降低董事会再次受到制裁的可能性。稳健性测试证实了结果。理论/学术意义:本研究提供的实证证据支持监管执法行动在诱导银行采取董事会层面的变革方面的作用。鉴于监管制裁与董事会特征变化之间的关系仍然被忽视,我们认为我们的结果可能会增加对执法行动在改善董事会特征方面的有效性的理解。从业者/政策含义:我们认为,我们的结果对正在进行的关于修订加强公司治理和银行监管的原则的辩论做出了明确而具体的贡献,从而具有政策含义。鉴于监管制裁与董事会特征变化之间的关系仍然被忽视,我们认为我们的结果可能会增加对执法行动在改善董事会特征方面的有效性的理解。从业者/政策含义:我们认为,我们的结果对正在进行的关于修订加强公司治理和银行监管的原则的辩论做出了明确而具体的贡献,从而具有政策含义。鉴于监管制裁与董事会特征变化之间的关系仍然被忽视,我们认为我们的结果可能会增加对执法行动在改善董事会特征方面的有效性的理解。从业者/政策含义:我们认为,我们的结果对正在进行的关于修订加强公司治理和银行监管的原则的辩论做出了明确而具体的贡献,从而具有政策含义。
更新日期:2020-10-18
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