Several allocation rules (such as the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution) allow for possible violations of the ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ (IIA) axiom in cooperative bargaining game theory. Nonetheless, there is no conclusive evidence on how contractions of feasible sets exactly affect bargaining outcomes. We have been able to identify a definite behavioral channel through which such contractions actually determine the outcomes of negotiated bargaining. We find that the direction and the extent of changes in bargaining outcomes, due to contraction of the feasible set, respond to the level of (given) agent asymmetry with a remarkable degree of regularity. Alongside, we conclude that the validity of the IIA axiom is only limited to symmetric games.

中文翻译：

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机会减少对议价结果的影响：状态不对称的实验

几种分配规则（例如Kalai–Smorodinsky解决方案）允许在合作议价博弈理论中可能违反“无关选择的独立性”（IIA）公理。但是，没有确凿的证据证明可行集的收缩如何精确地影响议价结果。我们已经能够确定一个明确的行为渠道，通过这种渠道，这种收缩实际上可以确定谈判的谈判结果。我们发现，由于可行集的收缩，讨价还价结果变化的方向和程度，对（给定的）代理人不对称程度的响应具有明显的规律性。同时，我们得出的结论是，IIA公理的有效性仅限于对称博弈。