We document outcome bias in situations where an agent makes risky financial decisions for a principal. In three experiments, we show that the principal’s evaluations and financial rewards for the agent are strongly affected by the random outcome of the risky investment. This happens despite her exact knowledge of the investment strategy, which can, therefore, be assessed independently of the outcome. The principal thus judges the same decision by the agent differently, depending on factors that the agent has no influence on. The effect of outcomes persists in a setting where principals communicate a preferred investment level. Principals are more satisfied with the agent after a random success when the agent did not follow the requested investment level, than after a failed investment that followed their explicit request.

在代理人为委托人做出冒险的财务决策的情况下，我们记录了结果偏差。在三个实验中，我们表明风险代理的随机结果强烈影响委托人对代理的评价和财务回报。尽管她确切了解投资策略，但仍会发生这种情况，因此可以独立于结果进行评估。因此，委托人根据代理没有影响的因素以不同的方式判断代理的同一决定。在委托人传达首选投资水平的情况下，结果的影响仍然存在。当代理商没有遵循所要求的投资水平时，与在其明确要求之后的失败投资之后相比，委托人对代理商的随机满意度更高。