In bargaining and negotiations, should one make the first offer or wait for the opponent to do so? Practitioners support the idea that moving first in bargaining is a mistake, while researchers find strong evidence that first-movers benefit from an anchoring effect. This paper addresses these issues from a theoretical perspective for the first time in the literature. It is found that first-movers benefit from a strategic advantage, while second-movers benefit from an information advantage. Therefore, the existence of first- and second-mover advantages depends crucially on the relative strength of these two effects. In line with the experimental literature, first-mover advantages are more prevalent, but second-mover advantages appear in very reasonable and realistic bargaining situations. Among other results, it is found that second-mover advantages require the existence of high-types (patient individuals) and differences in individuals’ preferences. The results also suggest a systematic first-mover advantage in contexts of great ambiguity, in which the anchoring effect of the first offer becomes the driving force.

中文翻译：

---

关于谈判和谈判中的第一手困境

在讨价还价和谈判中，是应该提出要约还是要等对手提出要约？从业者支持这样的观点，即在谈判中首先采取行动是一个错误，而研究人员发现有力的证据表明先动者会从锚定效应中受益。本文首次从理论角度解决了这些问题。人们发现，先行者将从战略优势中受益，而后进者则从信息优势中受益。因此，先行优势和后继优势的存在在很大程度上取决于这两种作用的相对强度。与实验文献一致，先行者优势更为普遍，但是后进者优势出现在非常合理和现实的讨价还价情况下。在其他结果中，已经发现，先行者的优势要求存在高类型的人（患者个体）和个体偏好的差异。结果还表明，在很大含糊的情况下，系统的先发优势，即先发信息的锚定效果成为驱动力。