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Additive multi-effort contests
Theory and Decision ( IF 0.802 ) Pub Date : 2020-03-16 , DOI: 10.1007/s11238-020-09749-1
Kjell Hausken

This article analyzes rent seeking with multiple additive efforts for each of two players. Impact on rent seeking occurs even when a player exerts only one effort. This contrasts with models of multiplicative efforts with impact on rent seeking only when a player exerts all its available efforts. An analytical solution is developed when the contest intensities are below one, and equal to one for one effort. Then, additional efforts causing interior solutions give players higher expected utilities and lower rent dissipation, which contrasts with earlier findings for multiplicative efforts. Players cut back on the effort with contest intensity equal to one, and exert alternative efforts instead. Accounting for solutions which have to be determined numerically, a Nash equilibrium selection method is provided. For illustration, an example with maximum two efforts for each player is provided. Equilibria are shown where both players choose both efforts, or one player withdraws from its most costly effort. Both players may collectively prefer to exclude one of their efforts, though in equilibrium, they may prefer both efforts. When all contest intensities are equal to one or larger than one, only the one most cost-effective effort is exerted, due to the logic of linear or convex production. Rent dissipation increases in the contest intensity, and is maximum when the players are equally advantaged determined by unit effort cost divided by impact.

中文翻译:

多项加法竞赛

本文分析了两个参与者中每个参与者在多方面努力下的寻租行为。即使玩家仅付出一种努力,也会对寻租产生影响。这与乘数努力的模型形成对比,后者仅在玩家尽力而为时才对寻租产生影响。当竞赛强度低于1且等于1时,便开发出一种分析解决方案。然后,导致内部解决方案的额外努力为玩家提供了更高的期望效用和更低的租金耗散,这与早期的乘法努力发现相反。玩家减少比赛强度等于1的努力,而改用其他努力。考虑到必须用数字确定的解,提供了一种纳什均衡选择方法。为了说明,提供了一个示例,其中每个玩家最多要花两个精力。均衡显示了两个参与者都选择了两种努力,或者一个参与者退出了最昂贵的努力。尽管处于平衡状态,他们可能更喜欢这两种努力,但两个参与者可能集体更喜欢排除他们的一项努力。当所有比赛强度都等于或大于1时,由于线性或凸形生产的逻辑,只进行了一项最具成本效益的努力。租金耗散会增加比赛的强度,而当玩家以单位工作成本除以影响力获得同等优势时,租金耗散会最大。尽管处于平衡状态,但他们可能更喜欢这两种努力。当所有比赛强度都等于或大于1时,由于线性或凸形生产的逻辑,只进行了一项最具成本效益的努力。租金耗散会增加比赛的强度,而当玩家以单位工作成本除以影响力获得同等优势时,租金耗散会最大。尽管处于平衡状态,但他们可能更喜欢这两种努力。当所有比赛强度都等于或大于1时,由于线性或凸形生产的逻辑,只进行了一项最具成本效益的努力。租金耗散会增加比赛的强度,而当玩家以单位工作成本除以影响力获得同等优势时,租金耗散会最大。
更新日期:2020-03-16
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