Sengupta and Sengupta (Int Econ Rev 35:347–359, 1994) consider a payoff configuration of a TU game as a viable proposal if it challenges each legitimate contender. Lauwers (Int Econ Rev 43:1369–1371, 2002) prove that the set of viable proposals is nonempty for every game. In the present paper, we prove that the set of viable proposals coincides with the coalition structure core if there exists an undominated proposal; otherwise, it coincides with the set of accessible proposals. This characterization result implies that a proposal is a viable proposal if and only if it is undominated or accessible. Moreover, we prove that the set of viable proposals includes the minimal dominant set, which is another nonempty extension of the coalition structure core introduced by Kóczy and Lauwers (Games Econ Behav 61:277–298, 2007). In particular, we prove that the set of viable proposals of a cohesive game coincides with the minimal dominant set.

中文翻译：

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关于可行提案的特征

Sengupta和Sengupta（Int Econ Rev 35：347-359，1994）认为，如果TU游戏的收益配置挑战每个合法竞争者，它都是可行的建议。Lauwers（Int Econ Rev 43：1369–1371，2002）证明，可行的提案对每场比赛都是非空的。在本文中，我们证明，如果存在未确定的提案，则可行提案的集合与联盟结构的核心是一致的；否则，它与可访问的建议集一致。此特征化结果暗示，只有且仅当撤消或可访问某个提议时，该提议才是可行的提议。此外，我们证明了可行的建议集包括最小主导集，这是由Kóczy和Lauwers引入的联盟结构核心的另一种非空扩展（Games Econ Behav 61：277–298，2007）。特别是，