This study considers a voting rule wherein each player sincerely votes when he/she has no information about the preferences of the other players. We introduce the concept of rank-dominant strategies to discuss the situation where a player is completely ignorant in the preferences of the other players and decision theoretic justification of the concept. We show that under the plurality voting rule with the equal probability random tie-breaking, sincere voting is always the rank-dominant strategy of each voter. We also discuss other scoring rules and show that sincere voting may not be a rank-dominant strategy of a voter even with the equal probability random tie-breaking.

这项研究考虑了一种投票规则，即当每个玩家没有其他玩家的偏好信息时，他们真诚地投票。我们介绍等级优先策略的概念，以讨论一个玩家完全不了解其他玩家的偏好以及该概念的决策理论依据的情况。我们证明，在具有等概率随机平局的多重投票规则下，真诚的投票始终是每个选民的等级优先策略。我们还讨论了其他计分规则，并表明，即使具有等概率的随机抢七，真诚的投票也可能不是投票者的优先策略。