Abstract

This article sheds light on the impact on household investment efficiency of a social norm that a man should not earn less than his wife. The experiment distinguishes this impact from that of spouses’ desire for control over household resources. Both husbands and wives are found to sacrifice household income (efficiency) for greater control; but, consistent with this social norm, husbands alone behave inefficiently if assigned a smaller income share than their spouse. The evidence suggests spiteful behavior among such husbands: they are willing to undercut their own income to narrow the gap with their wives’ earnings. The magnitude of husbands’ inefficiency influenced by this social norm is comparable to that when husbands have the least control over household earnings. These results, taken together with evidence from developed countries, show that this social norm has a persistent effect on household efficiency, distinct from spouses’ economic concerns.

中文翻译：

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我的，您的还是我们的？家庭投资决策的效率：一种实验方法

摘要

这篇文章阐明了社会规范对家庭投资效率的影响，即一个男人的收入不应少于其妻子。实验将这种影响与配偶对家庭资源控制的渴望区分开来。发现丈夫和妻子都牺牲了家庭收入（效率）以加强控制；但是，这种社会规范相一致，丈夫独自如果分配行为低效小的比自己的配偶的收入份额。证据表明有恶意这种丈夫的行为：他们愿意削减自己的收入，以缩小与妻子收入的差距。受这种社会规范影响的丈夫效率低下的程度与丈夫对家庭收入的控制最少的情况相当。这些结果与发达国家的证据一起表明，这种社会规范对家庭效率具有持续影响，与配偶的经济关切有所不同。