In this paper, we explore how globalization influences the decision of governments to rescue inefficient domestic firms when bailouts affect firms’ markup. We develop a model of international trade in which immobile domestic‐owned enterprises (DOEs) compete with foreign‐owned enterprises (FOEs) in an oligopolistic market. The decision to bail out DOEs leads to lower corporate tax revenues if FOEs are immobile, whereas tax revenues might increase if FOEs are mobile. Interestingly, the mobility of FOEs makes governments more prone to rescuing inefficient domestic firms because tax competition reduces the opportunity cost of a bailout policy in terms of public good provision.

中文翻译：

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全球化经济中企业救助的简单模型*

在本文中，我们探讨了当救助影响企业的加价时，全球化如何影响政府拯救低效率的国内企业的决策。我们建立了一种国际贸易模式，在这种模式下，不动产的国内企业（DOE）与外国企业（FOE）在寡头垄断市场中竞争。如果外商独资企业是固定的，那么对DOE纾困的决定会降低公司的税收收入，而如果外商独资企业是固定的，税收收入可能会增加。有趣的是，外商投资企业的流动性使政府更倾向于拯救效率低下的国内公司，因为税收竞争降低了公共产品提供方面的救助政策的机会成本。