This paper analyzes how patterns of international cooperation are affected if a group of states, led by a major power, pursues a strategy of “contested multilateralism” (CM). We conceptualize CM as a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining where CM lowers the gains actors can reap from cooperation in the short run. We demonstrate that, in the long run, CM nevertheless can have positive effects on international cooperation and specify when this is the case. Because of the costs associated with it, CM conveys a credible signal of the resolve of a dissatisfied group of states to contest the institutional status quo. Due to this capacity, CM alters the institutional and strategic environment within which institutional adjustment bargaining takes place. As a result, CM opens up the possibility for inter-institutional accommodation that increases realized cooperation gains. We probe the plausibility of our theoretical reasoning with empirical case studies on competitive regime creation in multilateral development finance and on regime-shifting in the governance of international trade in genetically modified organisms.

本文分析了如果以大国为首的一组国家奉行“有争议的多边主义”（CM）战略，国际合作模式将如何受到影响。我们将 CM 概念化为对制度调整谈判僵局的反应，其中 CM 降低了参与者可以从短期合作中获得的收益。我们证明，从长远来看，CM 仍然可以对国际合作产生积极影响，并具体说明何时是这种情况。由于与之相关的成本，CM 传达了一个可信的信号，表明一群不满意的国家决心挑战制度现状。由于这种能力，CM 改变了制度调整谈判发生的制度和战略环境。其结果，CM 为机构间协调开辟了可能性，从而增加了已实现的合作收益。我们通过关于多边发展融资中的竞争性制度创建和转基因生物国际贸易治理中的制度转变的实证案例研究来探讨我们理论推理的合理性。