During the global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve issued billions of dollars in liquidity swap agreements with foreign central banks, serving as a global lender of last resorts. Most studies of this event have analyzed the distribution of these swap lines using materially rational frameworks, which is logical under normal lending conditions. However, this approach does not account for the extensive evidence on social influences over decisions made under uncertainty. Meeting minutes from the Federal Reserve exhibit significant flexibility in recipient selection, and the content of these discussions suggest that social dynamics were important in members’ decision-making. This paper tests the effect of social similarity between foreign central banks and the Federal Reserve on the likelihood of receiving a swap line during the crisis. I introduce new measures of social similarity among central banks with data on employees’ professional ties and public speeches in the years preceding the global financial crisis. Statistical results show a positive, significant effect for social similarity on swap line receipt, even when tested alongside material predictors, and this social rationality appears to have been a deciding feature in some cases of swap distribution. I conclude with implications for future crises, and potential regulatory consequences.

在全球金融危机期间，美联储与外国央行发行了数十亿美元的流动性掉期协议，成为全球的最后贷款人。对该事件的大多数研究都使用实质合理的框架分析了这些掉期线的分布，这在正常贷款条件下是合乎逻辑的。但是，这种方法并不能说明在不确定性条件下社会影响决策的广泛证据。美联储会议纪要显示出在选择收件人方面的极大灵活性，这些讨论的内容表明，社会动态对成员的决策至关重要。本文测试了外国中央银行和美联储之间的社会相似性对危机期间接受掉期交易的可能性的影响。我将介绍全球央行之间社会相似性的新衡量标准，其中包括有关全球金融危机之前几年中员工的专业关系和公开演讲的数据。统计结果显示，即使与重大预测指标一起进行测试，社会相似性对掉期收款也会产生积极而显着的影响，并且这种社会理性似乎已成为掉期分配某些情况下的决定性特征。最后，我总结了对未来危机的潜在影响以及潜在的监管后果。在某些掉期分配情况下，这种社会理性似乎已成为决定性特征。最后，我总结了对未来危机的潜在影响以及潜在的监管后果。在某些掉期分配情况下，这种社会理性似乎已成为决定性特征。最后，我总结了对未来危机的潜在影响以及潜在的监管后果。