In this paper we address how external factors shape government decisions to break or uphold contracts, specifically focusing on how economic shocks and support from multilateral financial institutions shape leader decisions to expropriate from investors. Contrary to conventional wisdom and much of the existing scholarship, we argue that governments are less likely to expropriate from investors during periods of economic crisis since governments become more sensitive to the reputational costs of expropriating. We also argue that governments are sensitive to the levers other governments may use to punish for expropriation, such as withholding IMF and World Bank funding. We test these theories using a dataset of investment expropriations and case studies of thirty-four investment disputes that were resolved pre-claim. Our econometric analysis suggests that expropriations of foreign investment are less common during periods of crisis, and that countries under IMF agreements or borrowing from the World Bank are less likely to expropriate. Our thirty-four case studies, which substantiate the role of government reputation and multilateral pressure, support our statistical results.

中文翻译：

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危机与合同违约：征用的国内外决定因素

在本文中，我们将探讨外部因素如何影响政府打破或维持合同的决定，尤其关注经济冲击和多边金融机构的支持如何塑造从投资者那里没收的领导人决定。与传统观点和现有的许多奖学金相反，我们认为，在经济危机时期，政府从投资者手中没收的可能性较小，因为政府对征收的声誉成本变得更加敏感。我们还认为，政府对于其他政府可能会用以惩罚没收行为的手段很敏感，例如扣留IMF和世界银行的资金。我们使用投资没收的数据集和对三十四项已在索赔前解决的投资纠纷进行案例研究来检验这些理论。我们的计量经济学分析表明，在危机期间，没收外国投资的情况比较少见，而根据国际货币基金组织协议或从世界银行借款的国家，没收的可能性也较小。我们的34个案例研究证实了政府声誉和多边压力的作用，支持了我们的统计结果。