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Carbon taxes and climate commitment with non-constant time preference
The Review of Economic Studies ( IF 7.833 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-21 , DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa048 Terrence Iverson 1 , Larry Karp 2
The Review of Economic Studies ( IF 7.833 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-21 , DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa048 Terrence Iverson 1 , Larry Karp 2
Affiliation
We study the Markov Perfect equilibrium to a dynamic game in which private agents choose savings and a planner chooses climate policy. All agents have the same hyperbolic discount function. Using new algorithms, we solve the game with general functional forms (apart from isoelastic utility). We also obtain an analytic solution for a log-linear specialization. With hyperbolic discounting, convex damages lead to significant strategic interactions across generations of planners. The ability to commit to policy for over a century significantly increases welfare for the first generation, but the ability to commit for only a few decades has negligible benefit.
中文翻译:
具有非恒定时间偏好的碳税和气候承诺
我们研究了一个动态博弈的马尔可夫完美均衡,在这个博弈中,私人代理人选择储蓄,规划者选择气候政策。所有代理都具有相同的双曲线贴现函数。使用新算法,我们用一般的函数形式(除了等弹性效用)来解决游戏。我们还获得了对数线性专业化的解析解。通过双曲线贴现,凸损会导致几代规划者之间的重大战略互动。一个多世纪以来致力于政策的能力显着增加了第一代人的福利,但仅承诺几十年的能力所带来的收益微乎其微。
更新日期:2020-08-21
中文翻译:
具有非恒定时间偏好的碳税和气候承诺
我们研究了一个动态博弈的马尔可夫完美均衡,在这个博弈中,私人代理人选择储蓄,规划者选择气候政策。所有代理都具有相同的双曲线贴现函数。使用新算法,我们用一般的函数形式(除了等弹性效用)来解决游戏。我们还获得了对数线性专业化的解析解。通过双曲线贴现,凸损会导致几代规划者之间的重大战略互动。一个多世纪以来致力于政策的能力显着增加了第一代人的福利,但仅承诺几十年的能力所带来的收益微乎其微。