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Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions
The Journal of Industrial Economics ( IF 1.054 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-07 , DOI: 10.1111/joie.12233
David Barrus 1 , Frank Scott 2
Affiliation  

Collusion in auctions can take different forms, such as refraining from bidding. Certain aspects of highway procurement auctions facilitate collusive outcomes. We collect data on asphalt paving auctions conducted in Kentucky from 2005‐2007. We determine the potential service area of each asphalt plant and potential bidders for each paving project. We analyze firms’ bid participation decisions, including variables affecting costs as well as competitive and strategic effects. In many geographic markets where firms face only a few identifiable rivals, county boundaries serve as a coordinating mechanism for softening competition, significantly influencing firms’ decisions whether and how much to bid.

中文翻译:

公路采购拍卖中的单一投标人和默契合谋

拍卖中的串通可以采取不同的形式,例如避免竞标。公路采购拍卖的某些方面有助于串通结果。我们收集了2005-2007年在肯塔基州进行的沥青摊铺拍卖的数据。我们确定每个沥青厂的潜在服务区域以及每个摊铺项目的潜在投标人。我们分析公司的投标参与决策,包括影响成本以及竞争和战略效果的变量。在许多地区市场中,公司仅面对少数几个可识别的竞争对手,县域边界充当软化竞争的协调机制,极大地影响着公司决定是否竞标和竞标多少的决定。
更新日期:2020-09-07
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