当前位置: X-MOL 学术The Journal of Industrial Economics › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Warranty, Seller Reputation, and Buyer Experience: Evidence From EBAY Used Car Auctions
The Journal of Industrial Economics ( IF 1.054 ) Pub Date : 2020-02-05 , DOI: 10.1111/joie.12213
Xiaogang Che 1 , Hajime Katayama 2 , Peter Lee 3 , Nan Shi 4
Affiliation  

Using data from the eBay car auction market, we test several predictions regarding warranties, seller reputation and buyer experience in the determination of the final price. We find that the presence of a warranty generates a price premium, but that its magnitude decreases when the seller has a more established reputation. Compared to private sellers, professional dealers, who are ‘repeated‐game players’ in the market, benefit less from a warranty and its substitutability for seller reputation is relatively small. In addition, a buyer with greater experience tends to pay less for a warranty or for a professional dealership.

中文翻译:

保修,卖方声誉和买方经验:来自EBAY二手车拍卖的证据

使用来自eBay汽车拍卖市场的数据,我们在确定最终价格时测试了有关保修,卖方声誉和买方经验的几种预测。我们发现,保修的存在会产生价格溢价,但是当卖方享有更高的声誉时,保修的幅度会降低。与私人卖方相比,在市场上是“老牌玩家”的专业经销商从保修中受益较少,并且其对卖方声誉的可替代性相对较小。此外,经验丰富的买家往往会为保修或专业经销商支付更少的费用。
更新日期:2020-02-05
down
wechat
bug