With two news-based measures on war, I document that managers mitigated war risk through dividend cuts, arguably to establish a war chest. Moreover, I find that companies postponed their initial public offerings and that foreign companies were more likely to delist after the onset of wars. Investors reacted negatively to the increase in war news coverage. There is evidence of mean-reversion after a threat of war and a negative drift following the start of war. Finally, I highlight the importance of proximity to military conflicts. In general, the evidence indicates that both managers and investors became more risk averse as a consequence of war news.

中文翻译：

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战争风险对管理者和投资者行为的影响：来自 1914 年前布鲁塞尔证券交易所的证据

通过两项基于新闻的战争措施，我记录了经理们通过削减股息来减轻战争风险，可以说是为了建立一个战争基金。此外，我发现公司推迟了首次公开募股，外国公司更有可能在战争爆发后退市。投资者对战争新闻报道的增加反应消极。有证据表明战争威胁后的均值回归和战争开始后的负漂移。最后，我强调接近军事冲突的重要性。总的来说，有证据表明，由于战争新闻，管理者和投资者都变得更加厌恶风险。