In this paper, we consider that the public firm competes with a private firm caring about consumer surplus in vertically differentiated market. We explore the privatization policy, and the relationship between the optimal degree of privatization and the CSR degree of private firm. We find that if the public firm produces low-quality products, the government should adopt a policy of privatization, and the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing (increasing) in the CSR degree of private firm, if the cost difference of quality is sufficiently small (large). However, if the public firm produces high-quality products and the cost difference of quality is sufficiently large (small), the government should (not) adopt a policy of privatization. The government's privatization policy is related to the difference in quality and cost of the products produced by firms. We further analyze the endogenous selection of product quality between public firm and private firm and find that if the quality gap between high-quality products and low-quality products is sufficiently large, both firms will choose to produce high-quality products. If the product quality gap is of medium-intensity, the public firm chooses to produce low-quality products, and the private firm chooses to produce high-quality products. However, if the product quality gap is sufficiently small, there is no Nash equilibrium.

在本文中，我们认为上市公司与关注消费者剩余的私营公司在垂直差异化市场中竞争。我们探讨了私有化政策，以及私有化的最优程度与私营企业的 CSR 程度之间的关系。我们发现，如果上市公司生产劣质产品，政府应该采取私有化政策，如果质量成本差异足够小，私有化的最优程度在私有公司的CSR程度中是递减（递增）的。 （大的）。但是，如果上市公司生产高质量的产品，质量成本差异足够大（小），政府应该（不）采取私有化政策。政府' 私有化政策与企业生产的产品的质量和成本差异有关。我们进一步分析了上市公司和私营公司之间的产品质量内生选择，发现如果优质产品和劣质产品之间的质量差距足够大，两家公司都会选择生产优质产品。如果产品质量差距为中等强度，则上市公司选择生产低质量产品，而私营公司选择生产高质量产品。但是，如果产品质量差距足够小，则不存在纳什均衡。我们进一步分析了上市公司和私营公司之间的产品质量内生选择，发现如果优质产品和劣质产品之间的质量差距足够大，两家公司都会选择生产优质产品。如果产品质量差距为中等强度，则上市公司选择生产低质量产品，而私营公司选择生产高质量产品。但是，如果产品质量差距足够小，则不存在纳什均衡。我们进一步分析了上市公司和私营公司之间的产品质量内生选择，发现如果优质产品和劣质产品之间的质量差距足够大，两家公司都会选择生产优质产品。如果产品质量差距为中等强度，则上市公司选择生产低质量产品，而私营公司选择生产高质量产品。但是，如果产品质量差距足够小，则不存在纳什均衡。