We study escalation and aggression in an experimental first-strike game in which two participants play multiple rounds of a money-earning task. In each round, both players can spend money to accumulate weapons. The player with more weapons can spend money to strike against the other player, which almost totally eliminates the victim’s earnings potential and removes their capacity to strike. Weapons can serve as a means of deterrence. In four treatments, we find that deterrence is strengthened if weapon stocking cannot be observed, that a balance of power is effective in maintaining peace, and that mutually beneficial trade decreases the risk of confrontation, but not necessarily the likelihood of costly arms races.

中文翻译：

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军备竞赛和冲突：实验证据

我们在一个实验性的先发制人游戏中研究升级和侵略，其中两名参与者玩多轮赚钱任务。在每一轮中，双方玩家都可以花钱来积累武器。拥有更多武器的玩家可以花钱打击其他玩家，这几乎完全消除了受害者的收入潜力并消除了他们的打击能力。武器可以作为一种威慑手段。在四种处理方法中，我们发现，如果不能观察到武器储备，威慑力就会增强，力量平衡可以有效维护和平，互利贸易可以降低对抗风险，但不一定是代价高昂的军备竞赛的可能性。