A theoretical model and two experiments in the Philippines show that information about the mere existence of government programs influences both voter and candidate behavior. Theory predicts that incumbents shirk when voters are unaware of programs. Consistent with this, in the survey experiment, information indicating the availability of municipal development funds significantly reduces support for incumbent mayors. The field experiment distributed similar information to voters prior to municipal elections, with the full knowledge of candidates. Incumbent mayors increased vote buying in treatment areas to counteract the decrease in voter support. Effects were strongest in villages with fewer incumbent-provided public goods. JEL Code: D, P

中文翻译：

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购买知情选民：信息对选民和候选人的新影响*

菲律宾的一个理论模型和两个实验表明，关于政府计划存在的信息会影响选民和候选人的行为。Theory predicts that incumbents shirk when voters are unaware of programs. 与此一致的是，在调查实验中，表明市政发展资金可用的信息大大减少了对现任市长的支持。现场实验在市政选举之前向选民分发了类似的信息，并充分了解候选人。现任市长增加了在治疗区的投票购买，以抵消选民支持率的下降。在现任者提供的公共物品较少的村庄中效果最强。JEL代码：D，P