We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal segregation. Transportation costs facilitate the emergence of cardinal segregation as does competition from private schools. Furthermore, the latter renders the best public schools more elitist. The Deferred Acceptance mechanism is resilient to cardinal segregation.

中文翻译：

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学校选择设计、风险规避和基本隔离

我们将公立学校选择设计的问题嵌入到当地提供教育的模式中。我们将主要（学生）隔离定义为当具有相同顺序偏好的家庭在集中的学校选择程序中提交不同的学校排名时出现的隔离。在波士顿机制 (BM) 中，当较高类型的风险规避程度较低，并且学校的纵向分化足够时，任何均衡都呈现基本隔离。交通成本促进了基本隔离的出现，私立学校的竞争也是如此。此外，后者使最好的公立学校更加精英化。延迟接受机制对基本隔离具有弹性。