Research Handbook is the latest instalment in a series of edited volumes devoted to fiduciary law, reflecting burgeoning scholarly interest in this field. The editors’ vision is ambitious, to draw from principles developed “in varied relationship contexts over hundreds of years” in order to “unify the study of fiduciary law as a distinctive field”. As a starting point in this quest, the volume has achieved astounding success. The book is organised around a comprehensive framework that explores both the internal components of fiduciary law (its theories, obligations, and remedies) and the external terrains in which it operates or may operate (corporations, comparative law and public governance). Each of these parts engages with cutting edge issues in the field, and in doing so sheds light on topics for further inquiry, just as one would hope to see in a research handbook. A few examples suffice. The first part on theories seeks to define the fiduciary concept and provide novel explanations of the distinctively moralistic fiduciary rules. Velasco defines the fiduciary relationship as involving the substitutive exercise of legal capacity over the significant practical interests of the principal, whether it arises in jure through the principal’s appointment or de facto when the fiduciary’s influence amounts to effective control. The emphasis on substitutive capacity crucially distinguishes fiduciary relationships from relationships of influence, and helps tackle heated debates as to whether and when advisers, friends and parents can be fiduciaries. The other theoretical chapters seek to justify strict fiduciary duties (the conduct rules) and the more deferential standard of review of fiduciary discretion (the decision rules). Harding argues that fiduciary norms perform a signalling function as to the content of the norms around which parties can build trust and reliance in the fiduciary relationship. The signalling function itself does not explain why the content of the rule is the way it is, nor is it unique to fiduciary rules, but it complements the deterrence rationale behind them. Criddle invokes republican political theory to argue that the combination of strict conduct rules and deferential decision rules is designed to protect the beneficiary and fiduciary from domination by the arbitrary exercise of power. Taking a broader standpoint beyond moral and political theory, Gold observes that law and economics conceptions of loyalty have now been incorporated into fiduciary law, and calls for adjustment of the view that fiduciary law is strongly coherent with morality. A common feature of these three chapters is the authors’ willingness to go beyond familiar accounts of deterrence or the assertion that fiduciary profits are accountable because they arise from the fiduciary relationship as an accounting relationship. In doing so, they push the theoretical boundaries of our understanding of the subject. In the next two parts on obligations and remedies, we see further engagement with the nature and justification of fiduciary obligations, this time from a wider range of angles. The chapters on fiduciary obligations deal with: pragmatic concerns to overcome information asymmetry in the fiduciary relationship (Licht); the social and legal contexts of the proscriptive / prescriptive interpretations of fiduciary duty (Bainbridge); the uneven prophylactic operation of the no-profit rule across the contexts in which it operates (Kim); the view of fiduciary duties as involving the adoption of the principal’s goals and ends as one’s own (Laby); and the divergence between the concept of loyalty in fiduciary law and that found in morality (Miller). The two chapters on fiduciary remedies tackle new frontiers not yet fully explored in England and common law jurisdictions generally, but have become 220 [2019] The Cambridge Law Journal

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信托法研究手册。由D. Gordon Smith和Andrew S. Gold编辑。[马萨诸塞州切尔滕纳姆和北安普敦：爱德华·埃尔加出版社，2018年。xviii+ 448页。精装本180英镑。ISBN 978-01-78471-482-6。]

《研究手册》是一系列专门针对信托法的编辑著作中的最新一本，反映了该领域新兴的学术兴趣。编辑者的抱负是雄心勃勃的，他们借鉴了“数百年来在各种关系背景下发展起来的原则”，以“统一对信托法的研究作为一个独特领域”。作为此任务的起点，该书取得了惊人的成功。该书围绕一个全面的框架进行组织，该框架探讨了信托法的内部组成部分（其理论，义务和补救措施）以及它在其中或可能在其中运作的外部领域（公司，比较法和公共治理）。这些部分中的每一个都涉及该领域的前沿问题，从而阐明了需要进一步研究的主题，就像人们希望在研究手册中看到的一样。几个例子就足够了。理论的第一部分旨在定义信托概念，并为独特的道德主义信托规则提供新颖的解释。Velasco将受信关系定义为对委托人的重大实际利益进行法律行为能力的替代性行使，无论它是通过委托人的任命在法律上产生，还是实际上在受信人的影响等于有效控制时产生。对替代能力的强调从根本上区分了信托关系和影响力关系，并有助于解决有关顾问，朋友和父母是否以及何时可以成为信托人的激烈辩论。其他理论章节则试图证明严格的信托义务（行为规则）和对信托自由裁量权的更高尊重的审查标准（决策规则）。哈丁认为，受信规范就规范的内容起信号作用，各方可以围绕此内容建立对受信关系的信任和依赖。信号功能本身并不能解释规则的内容为何如此，也不是信托规则所独有的，但是它可以补充规则背后的威慑原理。克劳德（Criddle）引用共和党政治理论认为，严格的行为规则和尊严的决策规则相结合，旨在保护受益人和受信人不受任意行使权力的支配。在道德和政治理论之外，采取更广泛的立场，戈尔德指出，忠诚的法律和经济学观念已被纳入信托法中，并呼吁调整以下观点，即信托法与道德高度一致。这三章的共同特征是作者愿意超越人们对威慑力的熟悉描述，或者愿意相信信托利润是负责任的，因为它们来自于作为会计关系的信托关系。通过这样做，他们突破了我们对该主题的理解的理论界限。在接下来的关于义务和补救的两部分中，我们看到受信义务的性质和合理性有了进一步的介入，这一次是从更广泛的角度进行的。有关信托义务的章节涉及：克服信托关系中信息不对称的务实关注（利希特）；信托义务的描述性说明的社会和法律背景（班布里奇）；非营利规则在其运作的环境中的预防性运作不平衡（金）；信托义务的观点涉及采用委托人的目标并最终以自己的名义结束（Laby）；以及信托法中的忠诚概念与道德中的忠诚概念之间的差异（米勒）。关于信托救济的两章介绍了英格兰和普通法司法管辖区尚未全面探索的新领域，但已成为220 [2019] The Cambridge Law Journal 信托义务的观点涉及采取校长的目标并最终以自己的名义结束（Laby）；以及信托法中的忠诚概念与道德中的忠诚概念之间的差异（米勒）。关于信托救济的两章介绍了英格兰和普通法司法管辖区尚未全面探索的新领域，但已成为220 [2019] The Cambridge Law Journal 信托义务的观点涉及采用委托人的目标并最终以自己的名义结束（Laby）；以及信托法中的忠诚概念与道德中的忠诚概念之间的差异（米勒）。关于信托救济的两章介绍了英格兰和普通法司法管辖区尚未全面探索的新领域，但已成为220 [2019] The Cambridge Law Journal