While past research on minority acquisitions has ignored how agency conflicts could prevent acquirers from realizing value creation opportunities, this study investigates whether principal–agent and principal–principal conflicts with the target’s managers and controlling shareholder hinder acquirers’ ability to capture value from acquisitions of non-controlling equity stakes. Using archival data from a global sample of 443 minority acquisitions announced between 2011 and 2019, we found that cumulative abnormal returns are positively associated to minority shareholder protection and negatively associated to the presence of a strong controlling shareholder in the target firm. We also found that acquisitions of small non-controlling equity stakes amplify the negative effect of the strong controlling shareholder, which instead weakens if acquirers purchase large non-controlling equity stakes. This study contributes to the development of our understanding of the conditions that expose acquirers to value losses from minority acquisitions by examining the intricate bundle of agency conflicts with the target’s managers and controlling shareholder. In so doing, this study also provides useful insights to business practice.

尽管过去有关少数群体收购的研究已经忽略了代理机构冲突如何阻止收购方实现价值创造机会，但本研究调查了与目标公司的管理者和控股股东之间的委托人-代理人和委托人-主要人之间的冲突是否阻碍了收购方从非公司收购中获取价值的能力。 -控制股权。使用2011年至2019年期间宣布的443个全球少数股权收购的全球样本的存档数据，我们发现累积的异常收益与少数股东保护具有正相关关系，而与目标公司中强大的控股股东的存在则具有负相关关系。我们还发现，收购少量非控股股权会放大强大控股股东的负面影响，相反，如果收购方购买了大量非控制性股权，这将会削弱。通过研究与目标管理者和控股股东错综复杂的代理冲突，这项研究有助于我们理解使收购方面临少数收购带来的价值损失的条件。这样，本研究还为商业实践提供了有用的见解。