Abstract In this article, we tackle the legal question of the concurrence of a breach of contract and a delict through the lens of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. We begin by outlining the approach of the judiciary and reiterating the inconsistency between the treatment of traditional subjective interests (in other words physical harm to person and/or property) and purely economic interests (in other words non-physical harm). We then highlight the essential classical liberal premise (as adjusted by 20th-century reliance theory) that appears still to underpin the approach of our courts. Indeed, in the context of pure economic loss, it is said to be challenging to establish an independent delict in terms of the accepted ‘independent delict’ test. In this respect, we identify the delictual element of wrongfulness and in particular, the judiciary’s tendency to treat the risk of indeterminate liability and the anti-circumvention argument mechanically as overriding factors in the application of the boni mores test. We argue that this tendency is inconsistent with the broader constitutional movement away from classical liberalism and toward welfarism where values of human interdependence and solidarity must carry more weight. In more concrete terms, neither of these factors per se can automatically lead to a finding that the defendant did not have a legal duty in delict. At the same time, we maintain that the approach to concurrence in the context of physical harm via the application of the ‘independent delict’ test (as constitutionally informed) fosters a well-reasoned principled approach that enables the weighing up of pertinent policy considerations as required in the post-apartheid era. In the end, therefore, we aver that this (constitutionalised) ‘independent delict’ test ought to apply likewise to physical harm and pure economic loss where there is also a breach of contract. However, since the causing of pure economic loss is prima facie lawful (while positive conduct causing physical harm to person or property is prima facie wrongful), an important caveat in relation to pure economic loss is that the element of wrongfulness must be the function of the balancing exercise contemplated by the boni mores test, where the risk of indeterminate liability or the anti-circumvention argument may be relevant factors but cannot, without more, supersede the enquiry.

中文翻译：

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违宪与不法行为在宪法背景下的共存

摘要 在本文中，我们通过 1996 年南非共和国宪法的视角来解决违约和不法行为并存的法律问题。我们首先概述了司法机关的做法，并重申了两者之间的不一致。传统主观利益（即对人身和/或财产的身体伤害）和纯经济利益（即非身体伤害）的处理。然后，我们强调了基本的古典自由主义前提（根据 20 世纪的信赖理论进行了调整），它似乎仍然是我们法院方法的基础。事实上，在纯经济损失的背景下，据说根据公认的“独立不法行为”测试建立独立的不法行为具有挑战性。在这方面，我们确定了不法性的不法因素，特别是司法机构倾向于将不确定责任的风险和反规避论点机械地视为适用善意标准的压倒一切的因素。我们认为，这种趋势与从古典自由主义转向福利主义的更广泛的宪法运动不一致，在这种运动中，人类相互依存和团结的价值观必须具有更大的分量。更具体地说，这些因素本身都不能自动导致认定被告没有违法行为的法律义务。同时，我们坚持认为，通过应用“独立不法行为”测试（根据宪法）在身体伤害的情况下达成共识的方法促进了一种合理的原则性方法，可以权衡后所需的相关政策考虑因素。种族隔离时代。因此，最后，我们认为，这种（宪法化的）“独立不法行为”测试应该同样适用于同样存在违约的身体伤害和纯粹的经济损失。然而，由于造成纯经济损失表面上是合法的（而对人身或财产造成身体伤害的积极行为表面上是不法的），与纯经济损失相关的一个重要警告是，不法性的要素必须是Boni mores 测试所设想的平衡练习，