We propose the stationary Markov perfect equilibria of representative voting games as a benchmark to evaluate the outcomes of dynamic elections, in which the evolution of voters’ political power is endogenous. We show that the equilibria of dynamic elections can achieve this benchmark if politicians are sufficiently office motivated. For arbitrary equilibria of the electoral model, we characterize the faithfulness of politicians’ choices to the policy objectives of representative voters through a delegated best-response property. Finally, we provide conditions under which general dynamic electoral environments admit representative voters in each state.

中文翻译：

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代表投票游戏

我们提出代议性投票游戏的平稳马尔可夫完美均衡，作为评估动态选举结果的基准，在这种情况下，选民政治权力的演变是内生的。我们表明，如果政客有足够的上任动机，那么动态选举的平衡就可以达到这一基准。对于选举模型的任意均衡，我们通过委派最佳响应属性来表征政客选择对代表选民的政策目标的忠诚度。最后，我们提供了在一般动态选举环境下接纳每个州的代表性选民的条件。