In this paper, we consider a prize-sharing rule design problem in a group contest with effort complementarities within groups by employing a CES effort aggregator function. We derive the conditions for a monopolization rule that dominates an egalitarian rule if the objective of the rule design is to maximize the group’s winning probability. We find conditions under which the monopolization rule maximizes the group’s winning probability, while the egalitarian rule is strictly preferred by all members of the group. Without effort complementarity, there cannot be such a conflict of interest.

中文翻译：

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团体比赛中的努力互补和分享规则

在本文中，我们通过使用CES努力聚合器功能来考虑具有小组内努力互补性的小组竞赛中的奖品分享规则设计问题。如果规则设计的目的是使小组的获胜概率最大化，则可以得出垄断规则占主导地位的条件。我们发现了在哪些条件下垄断规则可以最大程度地提高集团的获胜概率，而均等主义规则则是该集团所有成员的严格选择。没有努力的互补，就不会有这种利益冲突。