The theory of incentives and matching theory can complement each other. In particular, matching theory can be a tool for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general equilibrium framework. We propose several models that study the endogenous payoffs of principals and agents as a function of the characteristics of all the market participants, as well as the joint attributes of the principal–agent pairs that partner in equilibrium. Moreover, considering each principal–agent relationship as part of a market may strongly influence our assessment of how the characteristics of the principal and the agent affect the optimal incentive contract. Finally, we discuss the effect of the existence of moral hazard on the nature of the matching between principals and agents that we may observe at equilibrium, compared to the matching that would happen if incentive concerns were absent.

激励理论和匹配理论可以互补。特别是，匹配理论可以成为分析一般均衡框架内最优激励合同的工具。我们提出了几种模型来研究委托人和代理人的内在收益，这些收益是所有市场参与者的特征的函数，以及在均衡中合伙的委托人-代理人对的联合属性。此外，将每个委托人-代理人关系视为市场的一部分可能会强烈影响我们对委托人和代理人的特征如何影响最佳激励合同的评估。最后，我们讨论了道德风险的存在对我们可能在均衡状态下观察到的委托人和代理人匹配性质的影响，