This study proposes a model of learning by supplying in an international outsourcing framework, where the supplier of a relationship-specific input can reverse engineer and become a competitor to its partner in the final goods market. Transmitting knowledge to a more capable supplier therefore creates competitive threat despite the benefits it brings within an outsourcing relationship. In particular, in markets with less differentiated products and for standard inputs that require less knowledge to be shared, choosing an intermediate capability level supplier prompts a strategic expansion of output to deter supplier entry in the final goods market, resulting in higher profits and welfare. A highly capable supplier is instead accommodated as a rival and is a source of royalty income when the relationship-specific input embeds more knowledge about the final product and when the competing varieties are differentiated.

这项研究提出了一种通过在国际外包框架中进行供应来学习的模型，在该模型中，特定于关系的输入的供应商可以进行反向工程，并成为其在最终商品市场中的合作伙伴的竞争者。因此，尽管将知识传递给能力更强的供应商会带来竞争威胁，但是这会给外包关系带来好处。特别是，在产品差异较小的市场和需要较少知识共享的标准投入品的市场中，选择中等能力水平的供应商会促进战略性的产出扩张，以阻止供应商进入最终商品市场，从而带来更高的利润和福利。