The ECB might seem to be the most independent central bank in the world. Its statutes were carefully designed to ensure independence and they are enshrined in an international treaty. Yet, while serving many governments may be a protection, it can also act as a constraint on policy decisions. This essay explains how the ECB has faced limits during the Eurozone crisis. First, it had to find ways to circumvent limitations to its essential function of lender in last resort to both banks and governments. Second, the procedure to appoint members of the Executive Board is open to political interferences. Finally, it is not well protected from fiscal dominance.

中文翻译：

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限制欧洲央行的独立性

欧洲央行似乎是世界上最独立的中央银行。它的法规经过精心设计以确保独立性，并且已载入国际条约中。但是，虽然为许多政府服务可能是一种保护，但它也可能会成为政策决策的约束。本文解释了欧洲央行在欧元区危机期间如何面对限制。首先，它必须找到方法来规避其对贷方的基本职能的限制，而这最终只能对银行和政府都适用。第二，任命执行局成员的程序容易受到政治干预。最后，它没有得到良好的财政支配地位保护。