Abstract

This paper makes an important and unique contribution to the Special Issue by problematizing the neglected role of law in the governance of global supply chains and the hidden costs resulting from this neglect. In Part I we argue that existing efforts within domestic and international law are ineffectual in holding transnational corporations accountable along their supply chains. The turn to private transnational mechanisms of governance, such as arbitration, is a direct response to this governance gap. However, in Part II we criticize international investment law and arbitration for their one-sided nature that privileges corporations over states and civil society. Adopting a critical political economy approach, this paper examines how efforts to address corporate social responsibility through international investment law and arbitration do not substantively uproot dominant ontologies or restructure power relations between corporations, states, and civil societies. Instead, we argue that these reforms contain hidden costs to transparency, participation, and accountability by empowering private transnational governance through arbitration, while further locking-in states to the operations of foreign corporations and the dictates of transnational capitalism.

摘要

本文通过质疑法律在全球供应链治理中被忽视的作用以及这种忽视导致的隐性成本，对特刊做出了重要而独特的贡献。在第一部分中，我们认为国内法和国际法中的现有努力在让跨国公司在其供应链中承担责任方面是无效的。转向私人跨国治理机制，例如仲裁，是对这种治理差距的直接回应。然而，在第二部分中，我们批评了国际投资法和仲裁的片面性，即赋予公司优于国家和公民社会的特权。采用批判性的政治经济学方法，本文探讨了通过国际投资法和仲裁解决企业社会责任的努力如何不会从根本上根除占主导地位的本体或重组公司、国家和公民社会之间的权力关系。相反，我们认为这些改革通过仲裁赋予私人跨国治理权力，同时进一步将国家锁定在外国公司的运营和跨国资本主义的指令中，从而包含透明度、参与和问责制的隐性成本。