We study a two-period model of behavior-based price discrimination, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (RAND J Econ 31(4):634–657, 2000), but we allow firms to make their product choices in the first period. We show that the only possible equilibrium involves maximal differentiation. This is in contrast to Choe et al. (Manag Sci 64(12):5669–5687, 2018), where equilibrium features less-than-maximal differentiation when competition is in personalized pricing. Thus, our result highlights an important interplay between the type of price competition and product choice.

中文翻译：

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基于行为的价格歧视和产品选择

我们研究了基于行为的价格歧视的两个时期模型，如Fudenberg和Tirole（RAND J Econ 31（4）：634–657，2000），但我们允许企业在第一阶段做出产品选择。我们表明，唯一可能的平衡涉及最大分化。这与Choe等人相反。（Manag Sci 64（12）：5669-5687，2018），其中在个性化定价中，竞争的差异小于最大差异。因此，我们的结果强调了价格竞争类型与产品选择之间的重要相互作用。