There is increasing political interest in the United States in an economy-wide carbon tax. However, many environmental groups see the emissions uncertainty under a carbon tax as a significant shortcoming, leaving them reluctant to support carbon taxes without some assurance about emissions outcomes. This has created an interest in options for reducing a carbon tax’s inherent emissions uncertainty. One leading approach is a tax adjustment mechanism (TAM), which automatically adjusts the carbon tax rate based on the level of actual emissions relative to a legislated target. This article examines the role for TAMs in carbon tax design and the trade-offs of alternative designs. Using two recent TAM proposals (in former U.S. Representative Carlos Curbelo’s [R-FL] MARKET CHOICE Act and for the Climate Leadership Council’s Carbon Dividends Plan), we show that TAMs can substantially reduce emissions uncertainty. We then show how different design choices affect expected costs and emissions outcomes. We show that most design features have clear trade-offs, improving some outcomes while worsening others. Thus the optimal design will depend on the specific goals of the TAM.

中文翻译：

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设计和评估美国碳税调整机制以减少排放不确定性

美国对整个经济范围内的碳税越来越感兴趣。但是，许多环保组织认为碳税下的排放不确定性是一个重大缺陷，使他们不愿对碳税表示支持，而对排放结果没有任何保证。这引起了人们对于减少碳税固有排放不确定性的选择的兴趣。一种领先的方法是税收调整机制（TAM），该机制会根据相对于立法目标的实际排放水平自动调整碳税税率。本文探讨了TAM在碳税设计中的作用以及替代设计的取舍。利用最近的两项TAM提案（在前美国代表卡洛斯·柯贝洛（Carlos Curbelo）的[R-FL]市场选择法》和气候领导委员会的碳股息计划中），我们表明，TAM可以大大减少排放的不确定性。然后，我们说明不同的设计选择如何影响预期的成本和排放结果。我们表明，大多数设计功能都有明显的权衡取舍，可以改善某些结果，而另一些则更糟。因此，最佳设计将取决于TAM的特定目标。