We compare axiomatizations between a value for cooperative games with transferable utilities (TU games), and a rule for auctions. The equal surplus division value on the set of zero-monotonic TU games is characterized by the following: individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, and equal effect of players’ nullification on others. Meanwhile, first-price auctions, on the general preference domain, are characterized by individual rationality, envy-freeness, and weak equal effect of buyers’ nullification on others. Here, envy-freeness implies Pareto efficiency in the model of auctions. Given the agents’ general preferences in the auction model, the characteristic of a weak equal effect of buyers’ nullification on others weakens the requirement of equal effect of players’ nullification on others. Although the two models are different, the corresponding axioms in both models require conditions corresponding to each other. In particular, individual rationality requires voluntary participation of agents, Pareto efficiency (or its stronger axiom of envy-freeness in the model of auctions) requires outcomes with no waste, and (weak) equal effect of players’ (buyers’) nullification on others requires equal treatment of agents when an agent is nullified. Therefore, in terms of axiomatizations, we can similarly interpret the equal surplus division value and first-price auctions.

中文翻译：

---

公理化的相似之处：相等的剩余分割价值和一价拍卖

我们比较了带有可转让效用的合作游戏（TU游戏）的价值与拍卖规则之间的公理化。零单调TU游戏集合上的相等剩余分割值具有以下特征：个人理性，帕累托效率以及玩家对他人无效的平等影响。同时，在一般优先权范围内的一价拍卖具有个人理性，嫉妒自由和购买者对他人无效的平等作用较弱的特征。在这里，无羡慕意味着拍卖模型中的帕累托效率。考虑到拍卖模式中代理商的普遍偏好，购买者对他人无效的平等效应弱的特征削弱了玩家对他人无效的平等效应的要求。尽管两种型号不同，两个模型中的相应公理都需要彼此对应的条件。尤其是，个人理性需要代理人的自愿参与，帕累托效率（或其在拍卖模型中更强的嫉妒自由公理）要求没有浪费的结果，以及参与者（买方）无效对他人的（弱）平等影响当代理无效时，需要对代理进行同等对待。因此，就公理化而言，我们可以类似地解释相等的剩余分割价值和第一价格拍卖。当参与者无效时，参与者（买方）无效对他人的（弱）同等效果需要平等对待代理。因此，就公理化而言，我们可以类似地解释相等的剩余分割价值和第一价格拍卖。当参与者无效时，参与者（买方）无效对他人的（弱）同等效果需要平等对待代理。因此，就公理化而言，我们可以类似地解释相等的剩余分割价值和第一价格拍卖。